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Abstract 
In this thesis, the author observes the puzzle of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war, 
accounting for both the strong and weak actor, using a Strategic Theory (i.e. Clausewitzian 
logic) narrative. He focuses on two arguments: (1) domestic politics cause friction for both 
actors, (2) international pressure (from state and non-state actors) causes friction for both 
actors. This international pressure also includes image. Using a variety of observation 
techniques and limited quantitative analysis, the author finds that (1) domestic political rivalry 
facilitates escalation for the strong and the weak actor and has no bearing on de-escalation; 
escalation erodes and diminishes domestic political rivalry. (2) International pressure and 
image facilitates de-escalation on both sides in order to maintain a positive image. (3) The 
weak actor must start de-escalating in response to the strong actor’s de-escalation; else it may 
very well damage its own capacity to achieve its political objectives. 
He then discusses the policy implications that this conclusion has, most notably (1) the way 
that policy-makers may change their behavior in order to improve their own image, or the 
image of the actor they represent. (2) They may or may not be more cautious when dealing 
with domestic rivalry, as they may seek to avoid escalating, and would rather tackle the actual 
cause of domestic rivalry.  
Opportunities for future research in the thesis. Most notable opportunities for future research 
include (1) the relationship between strong actor de-escalation and weak actor de-escalation 
and the way the former enables the latter. (2) The effect of the situation on the ground, rather 
than on the purely political level, on each actor’s decision to de-escalate.  
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Background 
What is Irregular War? 
It is obvious that not all wars are amongst equals: there are countless examples thereof. There 
are strong actors and weak actors. These actors can be states, organizations, militias and even 
individuals. It is the most basic assumption that actors are rational – they act in a rational way. 
The rationale may appear twisted and wrong to some, but it is a rationale. 
When does a war become “regular” and when does it become “irregular”? The distinction 
between these two kinds is a nuance that must first be made explicit in order to be able to 
study the phenomenon that is irregular warfare. Let me be clear – this is not a study of war 
doctrine, but rather of facilitating factors for escalation (as in: increased violence) and de-
escalation (as in: decreased violence) in irregular warfare, which come from outside the 
battlefield. 
First, one must understand what war is, as a whole. When Clausewitz wrote On War, he 
defined what war is: an iteration of policy, given physical form and implemented through 
violent means (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 75). When is war “regular” or “irregular”? How is it 
different from “asymmetrical” war? “Regular” war is the classic example of inter-state war. 
When the Soviet Union fought the United States and when the United States military fought 
China’s military in Korea, the war was regular; two regular armies (i.e. regulated armed 
forces), roughly of the same scale, fight. This does not mean that they meet on the battlefield 
– only that the armies are used as instruments in policies that oppose one another.  
This definition of “regular” war implies what “irregular” war is and also helps us define 
“asymmetric” war. We speak of “asymmetrical” war when two rivaling states use regular 
armies (i.e. regulated armed forces). In asymmetrical war, one state has the capacity to 
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completely devastate the other with relative ease, and yet it does not use its full capacity. 
When Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, the war was “asymmetrical”: Georgia had its own 
regular army and so did Russia. The Russian military had the capacity to relatively easily 
devastate the Georgian military, yet it did not. 
By following the logic of regular armed forces and power scales, we can arrive at the 
definition of “irregular” war: it is armed conflict (as a result of opposing policies) between a 
regular army (i.e. a state’s regulated armed forces) and a non-state actor (e.g. an organization), 
where one actor has the capacity to devastate the other one with relative ease and yet chooses 
not to do so. This definition implies a puzzle that is all too familiar to irregular war, which I 
shall illustrate by an example. 
 
The Case and Research Question 
On November 14, 2012, Israel launched the first air strike of its latest operation, named Pillar 
of Defense. The operation escalated quickly – hundreds of rockets and air strikes were fired 
each day, some reaching the suburbs of Tel-Aviv. By November 16, Israel called in 75,000 
reservists and mobilized troops in addition to several mechanized divisions. A ground 
invasion seemed all but certain. On November 21, a ceasefire was declared by both sides 
(brokered by Egypt).  
The above is an example of the implied puzzle in irregular war. Israel had clear material 
superiority and the capacity to devastate Hamas and bomb the Gaza Strip back to the Stone 
Age, yet it did not; it even agreed to de-escalate. Hamas lacks any navy or air force – yet it 
escalated and attacked this Goliath which had the capacity to devastate it in a most convincing 
way. This is not an isolated incident – the IRA escalated violence during its conflict with the 
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English military, knowing that the English have the capacity to wipe Belfast off the map and 
destroy all operational capacity of the IRA. Yet it did not happen. It seems irrational for a 
weak actor, so severely outgunned, to escalate violence in order to achieve its political aims. 
It seems irrational for the weaker actor to attack where the stronger actor is at its strongest. In 
order to solve this puzzle, I will use Operation Pillar of Defense as a case study. 
 
This thesis attempts to answer two questions that rise: (1) Why did Hamas escalate violence, 
knowing that Israel can devastate it? (2) Why did both sides de-escalate violence?  
By answering these questions, we address a larger, more general one: why do weak actors 
attack strong actors, and why do hostilities end without devastation of either side? By testing 
existing theories in the context of the two questions (i.e. the questions regarding the specific 
conflict), one can generalize the results and contribute to existing literature in the field of 
irregular war and strategic theory.  
Research Question: why did Israel and Hamas escalate and de-escalate violence during the 
November 2012 Gaza conflict? 
This question, while it focuses on the specific case study, will provide an answer to (at least) a 
part of the puzzle that is irregular war. By answering this research question, we also answer 
another question: why do weak actors and strong actors de-escalate in irregular war? Why 
does the weak actor attack the Goliath that could easily devastate it, and why does the strong 
actor not obliterate the weak actor? 
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Research design 
Theoretical Framework 
When approaching a puzzle such as this and formulating hypotheses, it is important to make 
any underlying assumptions explicit, both for the author and the reader, in order to keep these 
assumptions in mind.  
In my thesis, I aim on using Strategic Theory. The most basic idea of it is that it focuses on 
the ends (i.e. goals) and means (both material and immaterial) of actors (Harris, 2006, pp. 
540-541). This theory includes seven basic assumptions (Smith, Strategic Theory: What it 
is…and just as importantly, what it isn’t, 2011), which I will use in order to observe the 
actions taken during Operation Pillar of Defense.  
(1) The study of ends and means: these means are not necessarily tangible factors, but rather 
any factor – tangible or intangible – that influences any decision-maker (ibid.). (2) The 
political actor is the central unit of analysis: this means that the political actor can be a state, 
an organization, a social grouping, or anything in between. (3) We seek to understand the 
political actor’s values and preferences: this allows us to better understand why a political 
actor did something. (4) Any actor’s interest will be influenced by the wider, strategic 
environment: in other words, the actor is not necessarily in a state of isolation; it is influenced 
by its surroundings. (5) The actors behave rationally in pursuit of its aims: this does not mean 
that all rational decisions are good decisions, but rather that an actor decides after a cost-
benefit analysis (ibid). (6) Interests may clash: the individual actor rarely ever performs in 
solitude; rather, it is part of an environment, composed out of various different actors. This 
means that the capacity of specific actors to achieve their ends also depends on the interests 
and ends of other actors, which leaves room for clashes of interest (ibid.). (7) Moral 
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neutrality: Strategic Theory does not attempt to decide who is right and who is wrong; rather, 
it evaluates how effective actors’ means are in achieving their ends (ibid.). Clausewitz 
summarized these seven assumptions in one key sentence: “Strategic theory, therefore, deals 
with planning; or rather, it attempts to shed light on the components of war and their 
interrelationships, stressing those few principles or rules that can be demonstrated” 
(Clausewitz, 1984, p. 177). 
A single term appears in nearly all seven assumptions: “political”. For clarity’s sake, I will 
define political: “of relating to government, a government or the conduct or government” 
(Merriam-Webster, 2013). This applies both to Israel and Hamas, as both have governments 
or (in Hamas’ case) are the governments. 
Strategic Theory is based on Clausewitz’s work, On War. There are a couple of concepts of 
strategic theory that will be predominant in this thesis. (1) Friction (Clausewitz, 1984, pp. 
119-121); armies are not inexhaustible – in the same way a traveler is faced with many small 
perils along his journey that may exhaust him, so can armies lose their fervor and the decision 
makes (i.e. governments) may decide to stop committing the army to a cause because of the 
friction. (2) strategy (ibid., pp. 127-128); Clausewitz wrote that war, in addition to being 
rivaling policies given physical form (ibid., p. 75), is a series of engagements. He 
differentiates between strategy and tactics: tactics refers to the way engagements are fought 
(e.g. precision air-strikes, artillery strikes, etc.), while strategy refers to a higher level of war: 
it is not part of a specific engagement, but influences multiple engagements, both directly and 
indirectly.  
It is clear that Strategic Theory can help me address the puzzle of Operation Pillar of 
Defense. The seven basic assumptions effectively are an application of Occam’s razor: the 
simplest explanations are often the best (Merriam-Webster, 2013). Though it focuses on the 
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actors who actually (though not necessarily directly) influence the situation (i.e. political 
actors), it does not ignore non-state actor. This is especially attractive due to Hamas’ nature; it 
is an organization that also behaves as a government, rather than a state. 
Literature Review 
One must first look at Hamas – why did it escalate, knowing that Israel has the capacity to 
devastate it? One possible answer is the success of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the 
United Nations; the UN was going to vote on upgrading the PA’s status to a “non-member 
observer state” on November 30, possibly delegitimizing Hamas in the eyes of the 
Palestinians of Gaza, as the two organizations’ relationship deteriorated since the rather 
violent takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas in 2006. Thus, it is possible that in order to 
legitimize itself in the eyes of the Palestinians of Gaza, Hamas escalated violence against 
Israel, hoping that its new Fajr-5 missiles will cause sufficient damage to Israeli civilians. 
This relies on the conclusions of Escalation and de-escalation of violence in insurgencies: 
Insights from Northeast India (Goswami, 2013) that popular support is a major variable when 
a party decides to escalate or de-escalate. Goswami mentions a few specific resources that are 
influenced by popular support (ibid, p.35):  recruits, funding, bases of operations, intelligence 
networks and food supplies.  
A second possible reason is based on the so-called “Arab Spring”: following the fall of 
Mubarak in Egypt and the unstable summer of the Muslim Brotherhood’s (which happens to 
be Hamas’ father organization) rule, it is possible that Hamas’ leadership and the Muslim 
Brotherhood orchestrated the escalation, in order to portray Mohammed Morsi as the new, 
legitimate and moderate leader of the Arab world, by having Egypt mediate negotiations. At 
the same time, Hamas could demonstrate its prowess and scare any possible opponents and 
protesters in the Gaza Strip, using its new Fajr-5 missiles. This is probably impossible to 
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prove without sounding like a conspiracy theorist. It is still worth noting that despite this 
theory’s far-fetched nature, it does fit within Clausewitz’s view of war; Clausewitz said that 
war is actually policy, implemented with other (i.e. violent) means (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 75). 
He even went as far as saying that war will never be independent from policy (ibid., p. 87). 
Therefore, if Egyptian policy was aiming at portraying Mohammed Morsi as a moderate and 
responsible Arab leader, in contrast to the extremist Hamas (this is the part that will prove 
difficult – if not impossible – to empirically prove), it would be perfectly within reason for 
Hamas to start a small war with Israel. 
A third possible reason for Hamas’ escalation can be derived from Escalation in Irregular 
War (Smith, Escalation in Irregular War: Using Strategic Theory to Examine from First 
Principles, 2012): Smith notes that a weaker side may choose to escalate violence if it 
believes that it may eventually destroy the enemy’s (i.e. stronger actor) will to fight, cause 
enough material damage to level to playing field, or scare the enemy’s civilians so badly by 
targeting them, that the enemy’s civilian population will demand an end to the war, even if it 
means defeat (ibid., pp. 621-622). Hamas is infamous for its targeting of civilians. Smith also 
notes that widening the scope of violence (and thus inevitably targeting softer targets, i.e. 
civilians) is a way for the materially weaker side (i.e. weaker actor) to gain an edge over the 
stronger party (ibid., p.623). Therefore, Hamas’ targeting of civilians could be seen as a form 
of escalation, which serves another terror – gaining an advantage over the enemy (i.e. Israel 
and its military) by targeting civilians, thus destroying its will to fight and scaring the 
enemy’s civilian population through the use of terror. 
On the  Israeli side, one could claim that escalation was a completely rational reaction to 
rocket fire against its civilians since October. Being the stronger actor, it was rational for it to 
escalate, in order to re-establish deterrence and possibly cripple Hamas. This is supported by 
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Smith’s theory (ibid., pp. 624-625): he states that the stronger actor is faced with a dilemma. 
On the one hand, the strong actor is under attack, and no response might be perceived as 
weakness by the strong actor’s own population and by the assailing, weaker actor, thus 
encouraging further (one-sided) escalation. On the other hand, if the strong actor would use its 
full capacity in order to devastate the weaker actor, the stronger actor’s image (both 
internationally and internally) could be severely damaged. This demonstrates a key challenge 
of stronger actors who escalate in irregular wars: the perception of the conflict must remain 
manageable in the eyes of the strong actor’s population (ibid.). In the end, Smith says, this 
choice of the strong actor – to not devastate the weak actor – is influenced by politics. Smith 
defines politics as “those intangible factors involving the calculation of the relative 
importance of goals and values that impact on decisions about how much effort should be 
devoted to the attainment of particular objectives” (ibid., p. 625). This could apply very easily 
to the Israeli case – one could argue that Israel found it important to re-establish deterrence, 
but found the wiping out of Hamas in the Gaza Strip to be unimportant and too resource-
consuming, especially with elections being a few months away. 
It is also important to look at the reasons for de-escalation. This is especially true in the case 
of Operation Pillar of Defense – why did Israel and Hamas de-escalate so suddenly, when a 
ground invasion seemed all but certain? 75,000 reservists were called up by Israel, Hamas hit 
Tel-Aviv for the first time in many years with its new Fajr-5 missiles, and yet on November 
21, a ceasefire was reached, mediated by Egypt (Reuters, 2012). This puzzles the mind – why 
would a strong actor which has the capability to completely devastate the other side, after 
calling in so many reservists, agree to a ceasefire so suddenly? 
In Escalation and the War on Terror (Stone, 2012), Stone brings up an interesting point 
regarding de-escalation. He claims that “…popular impressions of how well the Western use 
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of force manage to stay below this same threshold” (ibid. p.655) is an important factor in the 
stronger actor’s to de-escalate. He specifically refers to the threshold in the combatant to non-
combatant casualty rate.  
This touches upon an interesting, underlying factor: popular support. Stone claims that the any 
actor’s ability to reach its objectives – be it weak or strong – is going to (partially) depend on 
the combatant to non-combatant ratio (ibid, p. 658). This can be one reason for de-escalation 
for both Hamas and Israel, in this specific case: both can judge the combatant to non-
combatant casualty ratio to be too low (as in: too many non-combatant casualties), which will 
erode their popular legitimacy, thus giving sufficient reason for de-escalation the stronger 
actor’s behalf. 
Another possible reason for strong actor de-escalation is touched upon by Clausewitz: 
friction. .When Clausewitz wrote of friction, he referred to obstacles to armed forces, both 
logistical and physical (Clausewitz, 1984, pp. 119-121), not dissimilar to a traveler who 
pushes himself to his limit; he tires and otherwise insignificant obstacles become significant. 
One of the major key components of Strategic Theory is the application of Clausewitzian 
logic to actors that may not necessarily be armed forces. With elections around the corner, it 
could be hypothesized that Benjamin Netanyahu (the Israeli Prime Minister at the time) did 
not want to get dragged into a war of attrition with Hamas, despite the obvious military 
advantage of the Israeli army. With the expected rise of two new parties – one being Yesh 
Atid and the other being Habayit Hayehudi, it is possible that Netanyahu was seeking to 
solidify his image as a “tough guy” who wins wars quickly, without endangering ground 
troops by sending them into the Gaza Strip. In other words – he saw future friction (elections 
and the upcoming new parties), and decided to avoid it. 
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A possible factor that facilitated the weak actor’s de-escalation is fear for an all-out Israeli 
assault; in The Terrorism Reader, an interesting conclusion is reached regarding escalation 
form the weak actor’s perspective – whenever the weaker side escalates, it must do so with 
incredible caution and dexterity, as heavy counter-escalation by the strong actor is likely to 
impede the weaker actor’s capacity to reach its aims (Laqueur, 1978, p. 264): weaker actors 
succeed only when the stronger actor does not use its full capacity. This means that if the 
weaker actor escalates too heavily, the stronger actor is more likely to be incentivized to use 
its full capacity, devastating the weaker actor. This could easily apply to Hamas – Israel has 
already recalled 75,000 troops by November 16, and it is possible that Hamas’ leadership saw 
an Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip as an impediment to its political goals; Israeli presence 
on the ground naturally means that Israel has greater control over the Gaza Strip and whatever 
goods that go in and out of it, which would limit Hamas’ capabilities. 
A second possible factor for the weak actor’s de-escalation has been touched upon earlier, 
when discussing the factors for escalation: popular support, as demonstrated by Goswami 
(2013, pp. 35-36). If Hamas’ leadership believed that escalating against Israel would lead to a 
loss of popular support it would de-escalate. There are several factors that are indicative of 
loss of popular support: (1) civilian deaths on the weaker actor’s side (2) the civilian 
population is less intimidated (3) rise of rival organizations (ibid.). It could be hypothesized 
that Hamas’ leadership decided to de-escalate following a predicted loss in popular support 
should it continue hostilities. 
A third reason for the weak actor to de-escalate would come from the civilian population of 
Israel: Hamas routinely targets civilians, probably hoping to scare the civilian population 
(Smith, 2012, p. 623), which has been touched upon earlier in this list of relevant factors. 
However, what if attacking the civilian population no longer causes any fear? What if the 
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civilian population has gotten used to being fired upon, and is no longer affected by these 
attacks, thus leaving Israel’s popular support as undamaged? That would be reason for de-
escalation. In other words: it can be hypothesized that increased civilian resilience to violence 
incentivizes the weaker actor to de-escalate. 
 
Another possible factor in facilitating de-escalation, on both sides, is international influence – 
while the UN and the US explicitly stated their support of Israel, so did Iran, Turkey and 
Egypt explicitly stated their support of Hamas. It is possible that sufficient pressure was 
applied on both Israel and Hamas to de-escalate as quickly as they did. 
A final possible factor for escalation and de-escalation on both sides is (international) image: 
it has become anything but uncommon for nations to apply “nation branding” strategies 
(Hudson, 2007). Hudson mentions foreign investment, tourism and trade as some incentives 
for this branding. Essentially, nation branding is a new form of public diplomacy (that is: 
“public diplomacy seeks to promote national interest through understanding, informing and 
influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between citizens and institutions and 
their counterparts abroad” (Public Diplomacy Alumni Association, 2013) ). Nation branding 
is a separate concept, rather than a section of public diplomacy. This is demonstrated in 
Nation Branding Explained (Hudson, 2007): (1) brand is treated as an asset which holds value 
for the state; (2) it focuses on the behavioral side of a nation. That is: the image is created 
more by actions than by propaganda (for lack of a better word); nations who seek to portray 
themselves in a certain way need to also act that way, rather than only use public diplomacy 
campaigns without changing their behavior. It can therefore be hypothesized that both the 
weak (Hamas) and the strong (Israel) actor decided to escalate in order to portray a certain 
image, and to de-escalate when either (1) further escalation would damage the actors’ image 
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(for example: Israel wanted to portray itself as the stable actor of the middle-east who does 
not tolerate any attack) or (2) de-escalation would improve either party’s image.  
This aspect of nation branding synergizes well with one conclusion of Escalation and de-
escalation of violence in insurgencies: Insights from Northeast India (Goswami, 2013): that 
popular support influences the weaker side’s willingness to escalate and de-escalate. It is 
obvious that image and popular support are closely intertwined. 
Hypotheses 
Having formulated several possible factors in escalation and de-escalation, I have come up 
with three hypotheses: 
H1: domestic political rivalry facilitates both escalation and de-escalation.  
H1 relies on Clausewitz’s notes regarding friction (Clausewitz, 1984, pp. 119-121). In this 
specific case study, it controls for the option that Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas wanted to 
solidify their position as the ruling party, because of the (projected) success of rival parties 
(Fatah for Hams, Yesh Atid and Habayit Hayehudi for Netanyahu’s Likud party). This 
hypothesis relies on two theories: (1) behavioral change in order to create another image (in 
the same spirit of nation branding, as in: trying to portray oneself as a stable or strong actor 
through action); (2) friction as a factor that incentivizes de-escalation (as in a prolonged 
conflict damaging an actor’s capacity and ability to achieve goals). 
H2: a low combatant to non-combatant casualty ratio (as in: more non-combatants died 
than actual combatants) incentivizes de-escalation of the strong actor.  
This hypothesis relies on Stone’s conclusions (Stone, 2012, p. 655), that the strong actor’s 
actions must be perceived in such a way that the amount of non-combatant casualties is below 
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a certain threshold. It also correlates with the theory of nation branding; a country’s image is 
affected by its actions, rather than purely by PR campaigns. 
 
H3: International image and pressure facilitates de-escalation for both sides.  
This hypothesis is based on two theories mentioned earlier: friction and nation branding being 
applied by using action in lieu of public relations campaigns. This hypothesis controls for two 
factors: official international (super-) governmental pressure (e.g. UN or a particularly 
powerful state condemnation or explicit support of either side) and also for the effects of non-
state actors (such as reporters and NGOs) on nation branding. 
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Methodology 
In order to be able to test the hypotheses, one must be able to understand how one actually 
measures escalation and de-escalation. 
Considering the nature of both actors (that is: governmental and/or military), getting 
qualitative data from decision-makers in order to understand their thought process is probably 
impossible. However, a quantitative analysis may still be useful to this case study 
In order to test H1, I will look into the presence of domestic (political) rivalries using Factiva 
– a database created by Down Jones to allow researchers to filter and select news articles. I 
will examine all news clippings regarding Israel and the area, starting at three months before 
the first day of the operation. In order to account for and avoid possible bias from one source, 
I will use four sources: British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Reuters, The Telegraph and 
Agence France-Presse (AFP).  
When one searches through a news database, one is bound to find an ample supply of 
irrelevant data: not all news is relevant news. In order to compensate for that, I will apply the 
following filters: (1) subject: not Commodity/Financial Market News, not 
Corporate/Industrial news, not Economic News, not Sports/Recreation. (2) Region: Israel or 
Gaza Strip. (3) Language: English. (4) Subject: International Relations, Military Actions. 
Source: BBC – All sources, The Telegraph, AFP, Reuters. 
I will code the findings into SPSS, by separating (1) the article’s subject (escalation, de-
escalation, regional (de-)stabilization and domestic rivalry of either actor), (2) its publishing 
date (any date between July 13 2012 and November 13 2012) and (3) the agency that 
published it. If an increase in the amount of articles covering political rivalry (for both Hamas 
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and Israel) will be observed. This will allow me to see when there is a spike in any subject 
over a given period of time and correlate it with either escalation or de-escalation. 
I will conduct the same research in order to control for correlation for both parties, only that I 
will change the time period of the articles to the entire duration of Operation Pillar of Defense 
(November 14-21). I will add one additional subject that I will use to sort the article type: 
International Reaction. This will include reactions from both other states (e.g. Egypt or the 
United States) and non-state actors (e.g. United Nations Security Council and the Arab 
League). This international reaction will have two sub-categories: (1) stating support or 
condemnation of either actor, (2) a call for ending all hostilities. All in all, I will have ten 
different subjects: (1) strong actor escalation, (2) strong actor de-escalation, (3) weak actor 
escalation, (4) weak actor de-escalation, (5) regional instability, (6) international 
condemnation of strong/support of weak actor, (7) international condemnation of 
weak/support of strong actor, (8) international call to end all violence, (9) domestic rivalry of 
the strong actor, (10) domestic rivalry of the weak actor. 
H2 will be tested by looking at official UN estimates, regarding the amount of Palestinian 
militants and civilians killed during the 8 days-long operation. Should the combatant-to-
civilian ratio prove equal to or less than 1:1 (1 combatant per 1 civilian or less), then this 
hypothesis may be rejected. If the ratio is greater, then this hypothesis may be confirmed. In 
order to account for bias, I will also use figures of the Intelligence and Terrorism Information 
Center – an independent research organization based in Israel. I write of bias because certain 
institutions of the United Nations – most notably its Human Rights Council – have a track 
record of strong bias against Israel, which could distort the numbers. If both estimates on the 
ratio are significantly different, a calculation of the mean will assume to be the actual ratio. I 
choose to calculate the mean because it is beyond my statistical capacity to quantify each 
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source’s reliability. This method relies on the concept of nation branding, where a nation’s 
actions influence its image to a far greater extent than exclusively using PR campaigns. 
If the (calculated) ratio proves to be less than 1, it will mean that fewer combatants than non-
combatants died and the hypothesis may be tested further. I will observe articles that were 
published during and after the operation - controlling for reports of disproportional damage to 
noncombatants. I will then check for correspondence with the article’s date and observed 
reports of strong actor de-escalation. 
H3 will be tested by using documentary data (ibid., pp. 227-245) regarding the portrayal of 
Operation Pillar of Defense by (1) international and supranational actors, such as the UN and 
the United States. It is important to understand what one is exactly looking for when 
analyzing documentary data from international and supranational actors: it will be probably 
impossible to obtain the meeting notes from the United States President’s briefing on the 
operation. However, one can observe how different nations reacted to the operation in their 
press releases and other official statements. This is what I will do. In order to increase 
accuracy of the findings, I will control for both initial and a second response. 
There is still the issue of bias – one can be all but certain that the Iranian response would be 
vastly different to the American response, due to the different relationships. Therefore, I will 
analyze responses from Egypt, the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council, Iran, 
the European Union, the Arab League and individual permanent member states of the United 
Nations Security Council. I chose these specific parties due to their power: a UNSC 
permanent member state will naturally have more power than a none-permanent member 
state, due to its ability to veto. Egypt, due to its physical proximity and close relationship with 
the weak actor (i.e. Hamas) also has significant power on the region, and Iran’s growing 
nuclear capabilities can undoubtedly help it project power onto the conflict. One can also 
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easily understand how the UN, UNSC, the Arab League and the EU have some power in the 
region: they are organizations that form a union of countries, and their actions to isolate or 
support any actor are bound to have an impact on the situation. Once I have compiled the 
data, I will check for correspondence with specific international reactions and de-escalation 
and will attempt to establish a logical connection, if any exists. 
In order to make the data more quantifiable, I will also use the data that I will collect while 
analyzing H1. In other words – I will analyze news reports of international actors’ responses 
during the operation, rather than only official documentation of responses.   
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An overview of Pillar of Defense – what happened? 
In order to be able to test the hypotheses, one must first know the facts: what happened in 
Operation Pillar of Defense, regardless of the theories of escalation, de-escalation and the 
nature of (irregular) war? In other words – what are the facts that set the background for this 
case study? 
As stated in the introduction, on November 14 2012, Israel launched the operation with the 
assassination of Ahmed Jabari, a high-ranking Hamas official. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs claimed that the operation was launched in response the latest round of escalation on 
November 10, when an anti-tank missile hit an IDF jeep (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2013). Operation Pillar of Defense was the first full-fledged operation of Israel in the Gaza 
Strip since the Gaza War (also known as Operation Cast Lead), which lasted for 22 days in 
2007-2008. In a very notable fashion, the United States Department of State released a press 
release, condemning Hamas and expressing support of Israel (US Department of State, 2012). 
On November 15, violence escalated on both sides. While Israel did not put “boots on the 
ground” (i.e. a ground invasion), the frequency of its air strikes increased. It is notable that on 
November 15, Hamas managed to launch rockets into Tel-Aviv’s suburbs. This was the first 
time the Tel-Aviv area was hit by any missile since the first Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein 
launched Scud missiles at the area (The Times of Israel, 2012). From that day until the end of 
the operation, missile fire aimed at Tel-Aviv became a regular occurrence. A condemnation of 
Israel’s strikes was received from Egypt, calling the UN to intervene and stop the violence 
(The Guardian, 2012). 
On November 16, a short cease-fire was negotiated for the visit of the Egyptian prime 
minister. This was short-lived, as both sides escalated and blamed each other for the initial 
violation of the cease-fire (The Telegraph, 2012). Later that evening, the Israeli parliament 
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approved calling up 75,000 reservists, raising the regular reservist cap (i.e. the amount of 
citizens that may be called up for reservist service) by 45,000 (The Jerusalem Post, 2012). 
Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Avigdor Lieberman, claimed that Israel was not 
considering overthrowing the government in Gaza, which is led by Hamas. On the same day, 
EU foreign policy chief – Catherine Ashton – expressed the EU’s support of Israel (The 
Jerusalem Post, 2012). 
On November 17, Israel escalated violence by also targeting Hamas government sites (The 
New York Times, 2012). In contrast to Lieberman’s words on November 16, Eli Yishai – 
minister of Interior – claimed that the aim of the operation was to “Bomb Gaza back to the 
Stone Age” (The Independent, 2012). Hamas continued firing rockets into Israel. By the end 
of the day, Israel mobilized some of its tanks in a move that seemed to indicate a coming 
invasion (CNN, 2012). Turkey’s president, Erdogan, condemned Israel’s action in the Gaza 
Strip and praised Egypt’s decision to recall its ambassador (Reuters, 2012). 
November 18 was marked by further escalation on the Israeli side, as Israel introduced naval 
shelling to the situation (IDF, 2012). During the day, the IDF struck a communications tower 
– which marked the first time during the operation it has actively targeted media infrastructure 
(Sky News, 2012). This caused a strong condemnation from Reporters Without Borders – a 
non-governmental organization that focuses on issues regarding press freedom (The 
Associated Press, 2012). On Hamas’ side, escalation continued in the form of firing missiles 
at Israeli towns and cities. By the end of the day, Benjamin Netanyahu – the Israeli Prime 
Minister – spoke to the cabinet and said that the IDF was ready for a “significant expansion of 
the operation”  (The Guardian, 2012), while the United Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary – 
William Hague – warned Israel against a ground invasion, which he claimed would erode 
much of Israel’s international support  (The Telegraph, 2012).  
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On November 19, Israeli air strikes and Hamas missile attacks resumed. There were no 
special cases of escalation, de-escalation or noteworthy international responses. 
On November 20, the building housing AFP’s office in the Gaza Strip was hit by an Israeli air 
strike (Huffington Post, 2012). Later that day, the United States Secretary of State – Hillary 
Clinton – traveled to the area to promote a ceasefire between the two actors (The Washington 
Post, 2012). She did not speak with Hamas, as the United States has designated it as a terrorist 
organization (FOX News, 2012). While Egypt’s president declared that a deal would be made 
that very day (Huffington Post, 2012), negotiations failed and violence resumed. Hamas made 
a move to de-escalate violence when one of its spokespersons stated that a deal for ceasefire 
was not far away (CNN, 2012). 
November 21, the final day of the operation, saw an initial increase in the amount of rocket 
attacks from Gaza. Israeli air strikes also escalated, damaging Al Jazeera’s office and the 
Associated Press’s offices in Gaza in a single air strike (Ma'an News Agency, 2012). AFP’s 
building was attacked again (The Huffington Post, 2012). On 21:00 (Israel time), the ceasefire 
between Israel and Hamas came into effect (Haaretz, 2012). 
The ceasefire 
It is naturally important to look at the final compromise of the ceasefire – it can tell us about 
both actors’ objectives and – to a limited extent – when they would be met to a sufficient 
enough degree to make a cease-fire both possible and plausible. The ceasefire includes seven 
conditions (ibid.).  
“(1a) Israel shall stop all hostilities in the Gaza Strip land, sea and air including incursions and 
targeting of individuals. (1b) All Palestinian factions shall stop all hostilities from the Gaza 
Strip against Israel including rocket attacks, and all attacks along the border. (1c) Opening the 
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crossings and facilitating the movements of people and transfer of goods, and refraining from 
restricting residents' free movements, and targeting residents in border areas and procedures 
of implementation shall be dealt with after 24 hours from the start of the ceasefire. (1d) Other 
matters as may be requested shall be addressed.” The sections following focus on the 
implementation of the ceasefire (ibid.) “(2a) Setting up the zero hour for the Ceasefire 
Understanding to enter into effect. (2b) Egypt shall receive assurances from each party that 
the party commits to what was agreed upon. (2c) Each party shall commit itself not to perform 
any acts that would breach this understanding. In case of any observations, Egypt – as the 
sponsor of this understanding – shall be informed to follow up.” (ibid.). 
After the ceasefire went into effect, both actors claimed victory. What this ceasefire achieved 
on paper was, essentially, two things: (1) granting both actors more room to maneuver; 
Israel’s civilians would not be targeted by rocket fire any more, while the Gaza Strip will be 
granted more freedom (e.g. no more (aerial) bombardments and re-opening supply lines). (2) 
It depicts Egypt as a stabilizing force in the region. This was reflected in the press release by 
the United States’ Hillary Clinton – Secretary of State – when the ceasefire was announced, as 
she said: “Egypt’s new government is assuming the responsibility and leadership that has long 
made this country a cornerstone of regional stability and peace” (US Department of State, 
2012).  
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The Analysis 
Strong actor escalation – domestic rivalry 
In this section, I will cover one of the factors which I hypothesized provide an incentive for 
escalation for the strong actor. The first one I noted was projected friction from domestic 
rivalry; it is our most basic assumption that actors behave in a rational matter. It is completely 
rational for any actor to avoid friction. In this section I strive to show the connection between 
escalating (thus increasing friction in the short-term, as one escalates violence) in order to 
avoid future friction. Tables 3-8 (see Appendix 2: Figures and Tables) show that domestic 
rivalry for the strong actor was reported on only before the operation.  
The next page features a crosstab created after filtering out all articles but those with the 
subject of domestic rivalry for the stronger actor, without filtering out any specific dates: 
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Table 1: Date * Subject (Domestic Rivalry: strong actor) Crosstabulation 
 
Article Subject 
Total Domestic Rivalry: strong actor 
Date 15-Aug-2012 1 1 
16-Aug-2012 1 1 
17-Aug-2012 1 1 
20-Aug-2012 1 1 
21-Aug-2012 1 1 
24-Aug-2012 1 1 
31-Aug-2012 1 1 
04-Sep-2012 1 1 
06-Sep-2012 3 3 
08-Sep-2012 1 1 
13-Sep-2012 1 1 
25-Sep-2012 1 1 
04-Oct-2012 1 1 
07-Oct-2012 1 1 
09-Oct-2012 1 1 
10-Oct-2012 1 1 
11-Oct-2012 1 1 
15-Oct-2012 1 1 
16-Oct-2012 1 1 
21-Oct-2012 1 1 
25-Oct-2012 1 1 
29-Oct-2012 1 1 
31-Oct-2012 2 2 
02-Nov-2012 1 1 
05-Nov-2012 2 2 
Total 29 29 
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It is noteworthy that literally no reports of domestic rivalry were recorded during the 
operation by any of the four sources used. This suggests that those who would normally be 
considered rivals for the strong actor (i.e. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister) – 
most notably competing domestic parties – considered it rational to not provide any friction 
during the operation, but rather before it. It is also noteworthy that out of the 29 observations 
of the friction caused by domestic rivalry, 12 were observed in the month of October – that is 
41% of all reports in one month. November had 3 observations, September 7 and August saw 
7, as well. This leads one to the logical conclusion that the strong actor (Netanyahu in this 
case) observed a (projected) increase in domestic friction over time and acted in order to 
reduce it in the future. It is not beyond reason that the elections coming January 2013 helped 
the strong actor make that decision. It is even possible – if one takes the concept of nation 
branding (see Literature Review) to heart – that the stronger actor escalated in order to create 
an internal image of a “tough guy”. This is also supported by the fact that a few days before 
the elections, Chuck Norris was seen starring in an Israeli pre-elections TV-advertisement, 
supporting Benjamin Netanyahu’s bid to continue his term as Prime Minister (Ynet News, 
2013). The next page has a bar chart which visualizes the difference in the amount of time 
strong actor escalation versus domestic rivalry for the strong actor was reported: 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Count of Articles: Strong Actor Domestic Rivalry and Strong Actor Escalation 
 
From this figure, we can see that as soon as no more reports of strong actor domestic rivalry 
were observed (i.e. November 5), reports of strong actor escalation rose from a total of 42 to 
53 by the start of the operation. By the end of the operation (November 21) a total of 79 
reports of strong actor escalation were observed. This means that there was a 26% increase in 
the total amount of reports on strong actor escalation between November 5 and November 14, 
in addition to a 49% increase in the total amount of reports on strong actor escalation from the 
operation’s beginning until its end, while observed reports on strong actor domestic rivalry 
grew by exactly 0%. 
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Did escalation cause reduced friction later? The evidence provided certainly suggests so. 
There is one additional fact that truly connects the different pieces in a logical way – the rise 
of two new parties: Habayit Hayehudi and Yesh Atid. It is blindingly obvious that when new 
parties arise and challenge the currently ruling party, friction is only a matter of time. The 
evidence I provided supports the logic that by escalating violence in November, the ruling 
party (i.e. Netanyahu’s Likud) reduced domestic friction during the operation to zero. This 
confirms one part of H1 – friction led to strong actor escalation. 
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Weak actor escalation – domestic rivalry 
One of the reasons that I chose Strategic Theory over the Political Realism approach is 
Political Realism’s nearly exclusive focus on states as the most important actors (Daub, 
2010). In irregular war, one of the actors – usually the weak actor – is per definition a non-
state actor. Thus, regarding it as a less important actor is probably not a good idea in the case 
of irregular war. In this section, I will control for friction from domestic rivalry the same way 
I did for Israel, only for the weak actor – Hamas. This means that I will start by filtering out 
all articles except for those that discuss domestic rivalry for the weak actor, which produces 
the following crosstab: 
Table 2: Date * Subject (Domestic Rivalry: weak actor) Crosstabulation 
 
Article Subject 
Domestic 
Rivalry: weak 
actor 
Date 13-Aug-2012 1 
14-Aug-2012 1 
17-Aug-2012 2 
25-Aug-2012 1 
26-Aug-2012 2 
01-Sep-2012 1 
02-Sep-2012 1 
03-Sep-2012 1 
04-Sep-2012 1 
05-Sep-2012 2 
11-Sep-2012 1 
12-Sep-2012 1 
19-Sep-2012 1 
20-Sep-2012 1 
08-Oct-2012 1 
18-Oct-2012 1 
30-Oct-2012 1 
Total 20 
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It is noteworthy that while August saw 7 observed reports of domestic rivalry for the weaker 
actor, September saw 10 reports, while October saw only 3 and November saw literally no 
observed reports of domestic rivalry for Hamas. 
The logical conclusion in this case is the same as in the strong actor’s case: increased 
domestic rivalry in September (50% of the reports) caused the weaker actor to perceive an 
increase in future friction. Thus, it decided to escalate. It is not unthinkable that the 
Palestinian Authority’s upcoming appeal to the UN was perceived as a threat and it would be 
logical for Hamas to do something in order to re-establish its position in the Gaza Strip as the 
dominant party inside the Gaza Strip. This also works well with the concept of nation 
branding – actors’ reputation is affected by their actions, rather than by pure PR campaigns. 
The next page has a bar chart which visualizes the difference in the amount of time weak 
actor escalation versus domestic rivalry for the weak actor was reported: 
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While the numbers differ, the graph bears a striking resemblance to the strong actor’s graph: 
as soon as both actors clash openly (i.e. the operation is launched), domestic rivalry is 
virtually nonexistent. It is also noteworthy that in the month October, when the weaker actor 
started escalating heavily, there were barely any reports of domestic rivalries.  
This evidence suggests the same conclusion for both the weak actor and the strong actor: 
increased domestic rivalry (as is observed) leads is followed by an escalation of violence (as 
observed), which is followed by a complete stop of observed domestic rivalry. All in all, I 
believe that it is safe to say that this proves positive for H1 – domestic (political) rivalry 
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facilitates escalation for the weak actor and for the strong actor. They were both faced with 
the same kind of friction, and both reacted to it similarly. 
 
Strong actor de-escalation – domestic rivalry 
When Clausewitz wrote on friction, he was referring to occurrences that made the general’s 
job (i.e. winning the war) difficult in the most mundane ways. Those obstacles were both 
external and internal. I have observed the way actors deal with friction by escalating – but 
how do they deal with it after the major escalation takes place? 
When I discussed the effect of domestic rivalry on friction and escalation, it was noteworthy 
that no domestic rivalry was reported on after November 5 for the strong actor, while 41% of 
the cases of domestic rivalry of the strong actor were observed in October. In the next page 
one can find crosstab of the observed reports on domestic resistance for the strong actor. 
 
Uria Levy (s1300229) 
Escalation and De-Escalation in Irregular War: a Clausewitzian Case Study 
31 
 
Table 3: Date * Subject (Domestic Rivalry: strong actor) Crosstabulation 
 
Article Subject 
Total Domestic Rivalry: strong actor 
Date 15-Aug-2012 1 1 
16-Aug-2012 1 1 
17-Aug-2012 1 1 
20-Aug-2012 1 1 
21-Aug-2012 1 1 
24-Aug-2012 1 1 
31-Aug-2012 1 1 
04-Sep-2012 1 1 
06-Sep-2012 3 3 
08-Sep-2012 1 1 
13-Sep-2012 1 1 
25-Sep-2012 1 1 
04-Oct-2012 1 1 
07-Oct-2012 1 1 
09-Oct-2012 1 1 
10-Oct-2012 1 1 
11-Oct-2012 1 1 
15-Oct-2012 1 1 
16-Oct-2012 1 1 
21-Oct-2012 1 1 
25-Oct-2012 1 1 
29-Oct-2012 1 1 
31-Oct-2012 2 2 
02-Nov-2012 1 1 
05-Nov-2012 2 2 
Total 29 29 
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The findings of the research – no observed reports on domestic rivalry during the operation – 
provide one with an interesting conclusion to H1 regarding domestic rivalry and de-escalation 
on the strong actor’s behalf: it does not exist and thus has no bearing on the strong actor’s 
decision to de-escalate. This part of H1 can be safely ruled out as a negative. 
There is logic to these findings –domestic rivalry caused the actor to be portrayed in a more 
negative light prior to the launch of the operation. Thus, the strong actor escalated against 
what it one could consider a common enemy: the weak actor. The evidence suggests that this 
works. In Israel’s specific case, one can also observe this: Yair Lapid, Naftali Bennett and 
Tzipi Livni – political leaders in Israel who would be commonly considered political 
opponents of Netanyahu – applauded the operation as soon as it was launched (The Jerusalem 
Post, 2012).  
To summarize – the evidence suggests that escalation of the stronger actor causes domestic 
rivalry to diminish. This means that domestic political rivalry does not have any effect on the 
actor’s choice to de-escalate and serves only as a catalyst for escalation on the strong actor’s 
side. 
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Weak actor de-escalation – domestic rivalry 
In the very same fashion as with the strong actor, domestic rivalry causes friction to the weak 
actor. As stated earlier, the evidence suggests that domestic rivalry is a catalyst for later 
escalation. While this is not the case for strong actor de-escalation, one must also observe and 
conclude how domestic rivalry affects the weaker actor’s choice to de-escalate. Hereunder is a 
crosstab of all observed reports of weak actor domestic rivalry. 
Table 4: Date * Subject (Domestic Rivalry: weak actor) Crosstabulation 
 
Article Subject 
Domestic 
Rivalry: weak 
actor 
Date 13-Aug-2012 1 
14-Aug-2012 1 
17-Aug-2012 2 
25-Aug-2012 1 
26-Aug-2012 2 
01-Sep-2012 1 
02-Sep-2012 1 
03-Sep-2012 1 
04-Sep-2012 1 
05-Sep-2012 2 
11-Sep-2012 1 
12-Sep-2012 1 
19-Sep-2012 1 
20-Sep-2012 1 
08-Oct-2012 1 
18-Oct-2012 1 
30-Oct-2012 1 
Total 20 
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Exactly like the strong actor, weak actor domestic rivalry diminishes as soon as heavy 
escalation takes place. The logic behind this is not different than the stronger actor’s: when a 
common enemy is escalated on (Israel for Hamas’ case), the otherwise opposing factions 
unite in order to take on their common enemy, thus eroding (and possibly even eliminating for 
a while) domestic rivalry. The evidence thus suggests that this part of H1 has been disproved. 
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Summary – domestic rivalry: escalation and de-escalation for both 
actors 
The evidence portrays a practically identical pattern for both actors. Domestic rivalry is 
followed by escalation (roughly a month later). When the escalation takes place, domestic 
rivalry is no longer observed - it is not beyond the realms of reason that the escalation creates 
a “greater evil” for both domestic rivals, thus eliminating rivalry until escalation is done. In 
other words, a common foe is created, and if “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” is true, 
then it is only rational for the actors that would otherwise be rivals to become allies in order to 
tackle this common enemy. Hereunder is a flowchart of the process: 
Figure 2: the observed relationship between domestic political rivalry and escalation 
 
In conclusion, H1 (“domestic political rivalry facilitates both escalation and de-escalation”) is 
exactly half-true and half-false; the evidence strongly suggests that domestic political rivalry 
facilitates escalation, but not de-escalation. 
Domestic political 
rivalry 
Escalation of 
violence 
Erodes 
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Strong actor de-escalation – casualty ratio as part of reputation and nation 
branding 
Having covered the issue of domestic political rivalry, I will now move to the second 
hypothesis: a low combatant to non-combatant casualty ratio (as in: more non-combatants 
died than actual combatants) incentivizes de-escalation of the strong actor. The UN has 
released a report (UN, 2013) regarding the operation and so did the Intelligence and Terrorism 
Information Center (ITIC, 2012). According to the United Nations’ report, 174 Palestinians 
were killed, including 101 civilians (UN, 2013, p. 4). The ITIC report claims that 178 
Palestinians were killed, out of which 101 were combatants. 
Table 5: Palestinian casualties and ratio per source 
Source * Ratio Crosstabulation 
 
Ratio 
Total .73 1.42 
Source ITIC 0 1 1 
UNHRC 1 0 1 
Total 1 1 2 
 
Table 6: descriptive statistics of ratios 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Ratio 2 .73 1.42 1.08 .48790 
 
These ratios are obviously significantly different (standard deviation is 0.49). As described in 
the Methodology section, I will use the mean in order to make up for this.  
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This final calculated ratio of 1.08 means that per each single non-combatant, 1.08 combatants 
died. This falsifies H2: if more combatants than non-combatants were killed and thus the de-
escalatory effect I mentioned when justifying H2 is impossible to measure and is therefore a 
null hypothesis. 
 
Strong actor de-escalation – international image and pressure as part of 
reputation and nation branding 
In order to test H3, I will start by checking for variety in international reactions. The research 
I conducted provides the following results for official international responses: 
Table 7: case summary of International Reactions  
Reacting party Reaction 
Secondary 
Reaction 
UN Call to end all 
violence 
None 
UNSC Call to end all 
violence 
None 
Arab League Support of 
weak 
actor/condemna
tion of strong 
actor 
None 
US Support of 
strong 
actor/condemna
tion of weak 
actor 
Urge weak 
actor to de-
escalate/show 
restraint 
UK Support of 
strong 
actor/condemna
tion of weak 
actor 
Urge strong 
actor to de-
escalate/show 
restraint 
Russia Call to end all 
violence 
Urge both 
actors to de-
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escalate/show 
restraint 
France Call to end all 
violence 
Urge strong 
actor to de-
escalate/show 
restraint 
Egypt Support of 
weak 
actor/condemna
tion of strong 
actor 
Appeal to 
International 
Community to 
sanction strong 
actor 
Iran Support of 
weak 
actor/condemna
tion of strong 
actor 
Appeal to 
International 
Community to 
sanction strong 
actor 
NATO Support of 
strong 
actor/condemna
tion of weak 
actor 
Urge strong 
actor to de-
escalate/show 
restraint 
EU Support of 
strong 
actor/condemna
tion of weak 
actor 
Urge strong 
actor to de-
escalate/show 
restraint 
China Call to end all 
violence 
Urge both 
actors to de-
escalate/show 
restraint 
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Table 8: frequency of initial and secondary reactions 
 
Initial Reaction 
Total 
Support of 
strong 
actor/condemna
tion of weak 
actor 
Support of weak 
actor/condemna
tion of strong 
actor 
Call to end all 
violence 
Secondary Reaction None 0 1 2 3 
Urge strong actor to de-
escalate/show restraint 
3 0 1 4 
Urge weak actor to de-
escalate/show restraint 
1 0 0 1 
Urge both actors to de-
escalate/show restraint 
0 0 2 2 
Appeal to International 
Community to sanction 
strong actor 
0 2 0 2 
Total 4 3 5 12 
 
Tables 7 and 8 initially show 4 observed occasions of support of the strong actor by an 
international actor, 3 observed occasions of support of the weak actor and 5 observed 
occasions of a call to end all violence, in general. Out of the 9 secondary reactions, 4 were 
calls for the strong actor to de-escalate, one call for the weak actor to de-escalate, 2 calls for 
both actors to de-escalate and 2 appeals to the international community to sanction the strong 
actor. It is noteworthy that the three cases where no secondary reaction was observed, at all, 
were all from supranational organizations: the UN, UNSC and the Arab League. 
The initial results are not surprising – it would make sense for states that are traditionally 
considered enemies or allies of either actor to condemn or support a particular party; the Arab 
League’s condemnation of Israel is a perfect example thereof. However, the fact that 4 out of 
9 secondary responses called for strong actor de-escalation is definitely noteworthy, 
especially when 3 out of those 4 reactions came from a party that initially expressed its 
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support of the strong actor. One must keep that in mind as one continues to observe cases of 
strong actor de-escalation during the operation: 
 
Table 9: Reported international reaction and strong actor de-escalation during the operation 
 
 
Subject 
Total 
International 
reaction: 
condemnation 
of weak/support 
of strong actor 
International 
reaction: call for 
end of violence 
Strong actor de-
escalation 
International 
reaction: 
condemnation 
of 
strong/support 
of weak actor 
Date 14-Nov-2012 0 0 0 1 1 
15-Nov-2012 0 0 0 3 3 
16-Nov-2012 0 1 0 2 3 
17-Nov-2012 0 0 0 1 1 
18-Nov-2012 1 0 0 1 2 
19-Nov-2012 1 6 0 1 8 
20-Nov-2012 1 2 1 1 5 
21-Nov-2012 3 1 5 0 9 
Total 6 10 6 10 32 
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Figure 3: strong actor de-escalation and international reactions during the operation 
 
One may wonder why there are more recorded instances of international reactions in the 
above figure 3 and table 9 than in tables 7 and 8. This happened because I did not discriminate 
between reacting parties when analyzing the press, unlike tables 7 and 8. I chose not to 
discriminate between the different reacting parties in order to obtain a more complete picture 
of the general international response, rather than that of particularly powerful actors.   
Two patterns seem to be prevalent: (1) immediate condemnation of the strong actor by 
international actors does not facilitate de-escalation. International actors showed their support 
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of the weak actor/condemned the strong actor since literally day 1 of the operation, yet no 
signs of de-escalation were seen immediately. Strong actor de-escalation was reported on first 
on November 20, six days into the operation. (2) Calls to end all hostilities, on the other hand, 
seem to be followed by strong actor de-escalation. This is supported by some of the findings 
in table 7 and 8: international actors who express their support of the strong actor had a 
secondary reaction, where they called for both parties to de-escalate. Out of the five recorded 
international organizations who called on both parties to de-escalate, two reiterated the same 
message, one changed its message and called upon the strong actor to de-escalate and two did 
not have a secondary reaction. It is also noteworthy that November 19 saw six different calls 
to end all violence – 60% of the total calls to end all violence during the operation – and that 
strong actor de-escalation occurred the day after. 
There is logic to these findings, of course. The logic rests upon the theory of nation branding 
(see Literature Review), where a nation’s reputation is affected by its deeds, rather than 
purely via PR campaign. Stone’s research (see Literature Review) speaks of the strong actor’s 
interest in maintaining an image of some moral superiority to the weak actor. In other words – 
the strong actor cares about its image and it serves as a factor for de-escalation. 
There is, of course, a meaning to these findings in addition to the theoretical logic. What these 
findings essentially do is confirm a part of H3 – international image, which influences 
international support, facilitates de-escalation for the stronger actor. This is observed in table 
9 and figure 3, where the international call for both sides and for the strong actor to de-
escalate was observed more frequently than anything else. 
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Figure 4: the effects of image and international pressure on strong actor de-escalation 
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Weak actor de-escalation – international image and pressure as part of 
reputation and nation branding 
When Stone wrote of de-escalation he wrote mostly of strong actor de-escalation and credited 
most weak him: if an organization actor de-escalation to fear of heavy counter-escalation. I 
find it odd that he credited international image (and thus pressure) only to the stronger actor’s 
interest in de-escalating. It makes sense for the weak actor to be at least as concerned 
regarding its image as the strong actor – it has the tendency to attack soft targets (i.e. 
civilians), which is probably frowned upon by most nations and supranational organizations 
such as the UN, EU, UNSC and NATO. If the weak actor seeks to obtain its political goals 
through violence, it should try to do so while not appearing as an organization that targets soft 
targets too often, else it will lose all form of international support, which will certainly harm 
its cause – as a weak actor, it makes sense for it to need international connections in order to 
fight the strong actor; supplies and money must be had. Therefore, I will analyze the weaker 
actor’s process of de-escalation in the same way I have analyzed the strong actor’s in the 
previous section. 
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Figure 5: weak actor de-escalation and international reactions during the operation 
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Table 10: weak actor de-escalation and international reaction case summary 
 Date 
Subject International reaction: 
condemnation of 
weak/support of strong actor 
1 18-Nov-2012 
2 19-Nov-2012 
3 20-Nov-2012 
4 21-Nov-2012 
5 21-Nov-2012 
6 21-Nov-2012 
Total N 6 
International reaction: call 
for end of violence 
1 16-Nov-2012 
2 19-Nov-2012 
3 19-Nov-2012 
4 19-Nov-2012 
5 19-Nov-2012 
6 19-Nov-2012 
7 19-Nov-2012 
8 20-Nov-2012 
9 20-Nov-2012 
10 21-Nov-2012 
Total N 10 
Weak actor de-escalation 1 20-Nov-2012 
2 21-Nov-2012 
Total N 2 
International reaction: 
condemnation of 
strong/support of weak actor 
1 14-Nov-2012 
2 15-Nov-2012 
3 15-Nov-2012 
4 15-Nov-2012 
5 16-Nov-2012 
6 16-Nov-2012 
7 17-Nov-2012 
8 18-Nov-2012 
9 19-Nov-2012 
10 20-Nov-2012 
Total N 10 
Total N 28 
Table 10 and figure 5 demonstrate a pattern very similar to the strong actor’s reaction to 
international pressure and possible change in image. At the beginning of the operation, more 
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reports of support of the weak actor/condemnation of the strong actor were observed. 
However, as the operation went on, support of the strong actor and calls to end all violence 
were observed. It is also noteworthy that weak actor de-escalation is first observed on 
November 20; the same day that the first report on strong actor de-escalation was observed 
(see figure 3). 
What that these findings suggest is that the weak actor and strong actor share the same logic, 
when de-escalation is concerned. It seems that the weak actor is also concerned with its 
international reputation: when one takes the concept of nation branding into account, it 
reputation nearly becomes a commodity; it brings investment and encourages international 
support when the reputation is positive, while it discourages foreigners and encourages 
support of the opponent when the reputation is negative. 
It is therefore not beyond the realm of reason to deduce that the weaker party’s logic was the 
following: it escalated when international support was prevalent. When the weaker actor saw 
the reported observed calls for mutual de-escalation and that the weaker actor also de-
escalated, it also de-escalated, in order to avoid damaging its reputation.  
There is one important factor in this logic that I must shed more light on: the weaker actor 
decided to de-escalate after the strong actor decided to de-escalate. This specific order of 
action is important, as it dictates the relationship between the strong and weak actor: while 
weak actor escalation and strong actor escalation was observed before the operation, initial 
escalation was from the weak actor’s side, as if it was saying “Your move” in a game of chess 
or cards. The operation’s launch was the same “Your move” from the strong actor, which was 
met by counter-escalation from the weak actor. This hints at a relationship, a series of turns 
between the two actors, which I will also discuss in the next segment. Before that, I will 
illustrate the weak actor’s behavioral process in de-escalation: 
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Figure 6: the effects of image and international pressure on weak actor de-escalation 
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Summary: weak and strong actor de-escalation: international image and 
pressure as part of nation branding 
The research’s findings suggest that international pressure, derived from image and the effects 
of nation branding (i.e. image is affected by actions, rather than pure PR campaigns), affects 
both actors in nearly identical ways: they both de-escalated in order to protect their image, 
which was affected by international pressure. 
When I discussed the way the weak actor de-escalated, I briefly covered the timing of the 
weak actor’s decision to de-escalate: it did so only after the strong actor decided to de-
escalate. I will elaborate on that now: 
The weak actor escalates first. This way, the weak actor essentially starts a game of chess or 
cards with the strong actor; it was basically saying “Your move” once it has escalated. The 
strong actor escalated, there was plenty of counter-escalation from both sides, until the full 
operation was launched and both actors found themselves in the state of irregular warfare. 
Once the operation was launched, in the specific case of Operation Pillar of Defense, 
international actors got involved; some urged for either side to de-escalate, some condemned, 
some showed support, but most encouraged both sides to de-escalate. 
If the weak actor were to initiate de-escalation process before the strong actor, while it would 
probably help it improve its reputation, it would risk ruining all it has been working to 
achieve; its political goals. The weak actor is the actor who has everything to lose, as the 
strong actor has the capacity to wipe it off of the face of the planet. By de-escalating first, it 
risks getting back to the proverbial square one. Thus, once the weak actor has initiated 
violence, it must wait for the strong actor to show willingness to de-escalate, which relies on 
the strong actor caring about the damage heavy escalation will cause it, should it choose to 
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continue escalating. The next page features the visualization of the complete relationship 
between strong and weak actor de-escalation, as part of international image and pressure in 
accordance to nation branding: 
pressure: 
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Figure 7: the relationship between strong and weak actor de-escalation 
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The results of the research conducted, in addition to the model, strongly suggest that H3 is 
completely true; international image and pressure facilitate de-escalation on both sides. 
However, one must always be aware that the strong actor must de-escalate first, as it is 
irrational for the weak actor to de-escalate first: it will harm its own ability to achieve its 
political objectives; the weak actor escalated in order to achieve its political objectives, in the 
first place. It must play the escalation and waiting-for-the-strong-actor-to-de-escalate game in 
order to have room to maneuver and achieve its political objectives.  
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Conclusion 
Concluding the hypotheses 
The research’s results are all but indecisive. The three hypotheses have clear answers: 
H1: domestic political rivalry facilitates both escalation and de-escalation 
The answer to this hypothesis is both “yes” and “no”. Domestic rivalry was followed by 
escalation for both actors in a nearly identical fashion. However, once a side escalated, 
domestic rivalry was no longer reported on – the parties that were each other’s opponents had 
a new, common enemy: the opposing actor, be it weak or strong.  
H2: a low combatant to non-combatant casualty ratio (as in: more non-combatants died 
than actual combatants) incentivizes de-escalation of the strong actor. 
This hypothesis was a null hypothesis for this specific case study: it was impossible to 
measure, as the combatant to non-combatant casualty rate was higher than 1, and thus could 
not have had the hypothesis’ effect on the strong actor.  
H3: International image and pressure facilitates de-escalation for both sides.  
This hypothesis was a clear positive: the evidence strongly suggests that escalation’s negative 
effect on international image facilitated both actors’ decisions to de-escalate. The relationship 
between the two actors’ decisions to de-escalate was most noteworthy: the weak actor must 
wait for the strong actor to de-escalate first, as de-escalating before that hampers the weak 
actor’s ability to achieve its political objectives. 
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Implications  
Nothing exists in a vacuum in the realm of international relations, especially cases of irregular 
warfare; we see the conflicts on our televisions, read about the latest dead in an air strike in 
the newspaper and read about the latest developments online. Information is everywhere and 
is at our fingertips. How does that work with these conclusions? 
I wrote of international image and the way it acts in order to facilitate de-escalation. We 
already see pictures shared by our more opinionated friends on Facebook, Twitter and other 
social media platforms. As technology advances, this kind of technology will become more 
and more commonplace and faster. Eventually, one may be able to even send live reports of 
battles, using their social network. 
For policy makers, these developments have a serious implication regarding how they ought 
to act. PR campaigns, as the concept of nation branding proved time and time, are no longer 
sufficient in order to keep an actor’s reputation and image positive. The actor must also 
behave in a good fashion. If one were optimistic and aiming for world peace, one would say 
that this encourages policy makers to behave in a more responsible ways and escalate 
violence less often. 
However, if one were to be a pessimist, one could also see how this leads to misinformation 
(as in: spreading false information). Anyone can get a profile on social media, anyone can 
upload a video to YouTube, no matter how poorly edited. There is no quality, accuracy or 
authenticity control on a lot of the information that we find on our fingertips. Why would 
policy makers not spread false information, in order to discredit the opposing actor? “Look,” 
they would say, “they are massacring civilians!” when, in fact, it was not the case. “Smear 
campaigns” would become the norm. 
Uria Levy (s1300229) 
Escalation and De-Escalation in Irregular War: a Clausewitzian Case Study 
55 
 
In reality, things are never entirely black or white. What we may probably see arise is a 
combination of the optimist and pessimist view: policy makers no longer count on pure PR 
campaigns that exaggerate any particular actor’s “good” side, but rather behave in a way that 
the actor’s “good” side is reflected. However, misinformation and “smear campaigns” will 
still be issues – it will be the challenge for policy makers to find a way to maintain 
international support, despite misinformation and the campaigns. 
Another interesting perspective for implications is the conclusion regarding the role of 
domestic rivalry as a catalyst for escalation. Once again, these implications depend on 
whether one is an optimist or a pessimist, as far as human nature and peace are concerned. If 
one would be a pessimist, one could see how policy makers who wish to avoid friction would 
escalate violence against the opposing actor, in order to (temporarily) eliminate rivalry and 
the friction it has caused. One could also imagine the implications for policy makers with 
nefarious intentions; they may encourage domestic rivalry for either actor, in order to cause an 
escalation of violence and profit from it. 
If one would be an optimist, one could see how these findings imply that policy makers may 
behave more cautiously when faced with domestic rivalry – rather than escalate against the 
other actor, they may avoid the escalation and actually tackle the cause of the domestic 
rivalry. 
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Future research 
There are many more factors of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war. When I 
analyzed H2, I honestly did not expect to find no good data. It is important to continue 
research on the extent to which a negative combatant to non-combatant casualty ratio by the 
strong actor facilitates strong actor de-escalation. 
When I discussed H3, I noted that there was interaction between the weak and strong actor’s 
de-escalation: the weak actor seems to only de-escalate after the strong actor has de-escalated 
in order to not damage its capacity to achieve its political objectives. To which extent is that 
true? Are there limits and factors that influence the extent to which this is true? 
This research focused on two aspects of escalation and de-escalation: domestic and 
international aspects. It is blindingly obvious that certain tactical situations affect escalation 
and de-escalation; what are they? This, also, is an interesting perspective to research in the 
future.  
Another interesting perspective for future research is in the conclusion of H1 – to which 
extent does escalation erode domestic political rivalry? It is possible that domestic political 
rivalry is only pushed to the sidelines in order to deal with the common foe, rather than 
eroded. Once both parties have de-escalated, does domestic rivalry re-appear? If it does, is it 
as intense? 
The puzzle that is irregular war is still not fully solved – but it is my sincerest belief that this 
thesis has shed some light on the factors that facilitate escalation and de-escalation. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: List of Acronyms 
EU: European Union 
IDF: Israeli Defense Forces 
ITIC: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 
UN: United Nations 
UNSC: United Nations Security Council 
US: United States 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
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Appendix 2: Tables and Figures 
Table 11: Factiva News Filter Used 
 Subject Region Language Source 
Filter Not 
Commodity/Financial 
Market News, Not 
Corporate/Industrial 
News, Not Economic 
News, Not 
Sports/Recreation. 
Subjects are 
International 
Relations and 
Military Action 
Israel Or 
Gaza Strip 
English BBC – All 
Sources, 
Reuters, 
AFP, The 
Telegraph 
 
Table 12: Total Frequency of Article Subject 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strong actor escalation 79 23.0 23.0 23.0 
Weak actor escalation 40 11.6 11.6 34.6 
Regional (in)stability 131 38.1 38.1 72.7 
Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
29 8.4 8.4 81.1 
International reaction: 
condemnation of 
weak/support of strong 
actor 
6 1.7 1.7 82.8 
International reaction: 
call for end of violence 
10 2.9 2.9 85.8 
Strong actor de-
escalation 
13 3.8 3.8 89.5 
Weak actor de-
escalation 
4 1.2 1.2 90.7 
Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
20 5.8 5.8 96.5 
International reaction: 
condemnation of 
strong/support of weak 
actor 
12 3.5 3.5 100.0 
Total 344 100.0 100.0  
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Table 13: Total Frequency of Article Subject per Source 
 
Frequenc
y Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ
e Percent 
Valid Reuters: Strong actor 
escalation 
14 4.1 4.1 4.1 
Reuters: Weak actor 
escalation 
7 2.0 2.0 6.1 
Reuters: Regional 
(in)stability 
32 9.3 9.3 15.4 
Reuters: Domestic 
Rivalry: strong actor 
9 2.6 2.6 18.0 
Reuters: International 
reaction: condemnation 
of weak/support of 
strong actor 
3 .9 .9 18.9 
Reuters: International 
reaction: call for end of 
violence 
3 .9 .9 19.8 
Reuters: Strong actor 
de-escalation 
1 .3 .3 20.1 
Reuters: Domestic 
Rivalry: weak actor 
3 .9 .9 20.9 
Reuters: International 
reaction: condemnation 
of strong/support of 
weak actor 
5 1.5 1.5 22.4 
BBC: Strong actor 
escalation 
21 6.1 6.1 28.5 
BBC: Weak actor 
escalation 
13 3.8 3.8 32.3 
BBC: Regional 
(in)stability 
44 12.8 12.8 45.1 
BBC: Domestic 
Rivalry: strong actor 
12 3.5 3.5 48.5 
BBC: Strong actor de-
escalation 
5 1.5 1.5 50.0 
BBC: Weak actor de- 1 .3 .3 50.3 
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escalation 
BBC: Domestic 
Rivalry: weak actor 
15 4.4 4.4 54.7 
BBC: International 
reaction: condemnation 
of strong/support of 
weak actor 
4 1.2 1.2 55.8 
AFP: Strong actor 
escalation 
34 9.9 9.9 65.7 
AFP: Weak actor 
escalation 
18 5.2 5.2 70.9 
AFP: Regional 
(in)stability 
43 12.5 12.5 83.4 
AFP: Domestic 
Rivalry: strong actor 
5 1.5 1.5 84.9 
AFP: International 
reaction: condemnation 
of weak/support of 
strong actor 
2 .6 .6 85.5 
AFP: International 
reaction: call for end of 
violence 
5 1.5 1.5 86.9 
AFP: Strong actor de-
escalation 
3 .9 .9 87.8 
AFP: Weak actor de-
escalation 
2 .6 .6 88.4 
AFP: Domestic 
Rivalry: weak actor 
2 .6 .6 89.0 
AFP: International 
reaction: condemnation 
of strong/support of 
weak actor 
3 .9 .9 89.8 
The Telegraph: Strong 
actor escalation 
10 2.9 2.9 92.7 
The Telegraph: Weak 
actor escalation 
2 .6 .6 93.3 
The Telegraph: 
Regional (in)stability 
12 3.5 3.5 96.8 
The Telegraph: 
Domestic Rivalry: 
3 .9 .9 97.7 
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strong actor 
The Telegraph: 
International reaction: 
condemnation of 
weak/support of strong 
actor 
1 .3 .3 98.0 
The Telegraph: 
International reaction: 
call for end of violence 
2 .6 .6 98.5 
The Telegraph: Strong 
actor de-escalation 
4 1.2 1.2 99.7 
The Telegraph: Weak 
actor de-escalation 
1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 344 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 
Table 14: Article Subject Frequency per Source: August 13-31 
 Subject 
date 13-Aug-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 2 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 4 
14-Aug-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 2 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
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Total N 3 
15-Aug-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 2 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 4 
16-Aug-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
3 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 3 
The 
Telegraph 
1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 1 
Total N 5 
17-Aug-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 2 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
3 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 3 
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AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 2 
The 
Telegraph 
1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 1 
Total N 8 
18-Aug-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 1 
19-Aug-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Strong actor de-
escalation 
Total N 1 
Total N 1 
20-Aug-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor 
escalation 
3 Regional 
(in)stability 
4 Regional 
(in)stability 
5 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 5 
Total N 5 
21-Aug-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
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Total N 2 
Total N 4 
22-Aug-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 1 
23-Aug-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 2 
24-Aug-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
3 Weak actor de-
escalation 
Total N 3 
Total N 3 
25-Aug-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 1 
Total N 1 
26-Aug-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Weak actor 
escalation 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
3 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 3 
AFP 1 Weak actor 
escalation 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 2 
Total N 5 
28-Aug- Source Reuters 1 Strong actor 
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2012 escalation 
2 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 2 
BBC 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
The 
Telegraph 
1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 5 
29-Aug-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 2 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 3 
30-Aug-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 2 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 3 
31-Aug-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
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escalation 
2 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 2 
Total N 4 
Total N 62 
 
 
Table 15: Article Subject Frequency per Source: September 1-15 
 
 Subject 
Date 01-Sep-2012 Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Weak actor 
escalation 
3 Weak actor 
escalation 
4 Regional 
(in)stability 
5 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 5 
Total N 6 
02-Sep-2012 Source BBC 1 Weak actor 
escalation 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
3 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 3 
The 
Telegraph 
1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 4 
03-Sep-2012 Source BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
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2 Regional 
(in)stability 
3 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 3 
Total N 3 
04-Sep-2012 Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 2 
Total N 3 
05-Sep-2012 Source Reuters 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
3 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 3 
BBC 1 Weak actor 
escalation 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 2 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor de-
escalation 
Total N 2 
Total N 7 
06-Sep-2012 Source Reuters 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
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strong actor 
3 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
4 Strong actor de-
escalation 
Total N 4 
Total N 5 
07-Sep-2012 Source BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 International 
reaction: 
condemnation of 
strong/support of 
weak actor 
Total N 2 
AFP 1 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
Total N 3 
08-Sep-2012 Source BBC 1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 2 
09-Sep-2012 Source BBC 1 Weak actor 
escalation 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 2 
Total N 2 
10-Sep-2012 Source BBC 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 International 
reaction: 
condemnation of 
strong/support of 
weak actor 
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Total N 2 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 2 
Total N 4 
11-Sep-2012 Source BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
3 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 3 
AFP 1 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
Total N 4 
12-Sep-2012 Source BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 2 
Total N 2 
13-Sep-2012 Source Reuters 1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 2 
Total N 3 
15-Sep-2012 Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
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Total N 2 
Total N 50 
 
 
Table 16: Article Subject Frequency per Source: September 16-30 
 Subject 
Date 16-Sep-2012 Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 2 
18-Sep-2012 Source AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 1 
19-Sep-2012 Source Reuters 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 2 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 2 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
Total N 5 
20-Sep-2012 Source BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Strong actor de-
escalation 
Total N 2 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
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2 Strong actor 
escalation 
3 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 3 
Total N 5 
21-Sep-2012 Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
3 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 3 
Total N 5 
22-Sep-2012 Source The 
Telegraph 
1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 1 
23-Sep-2012 Source BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 2 
24-Sep-2012 Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 1 
25-Sep-2012 Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
Uria Levy (s1300229) 
Escalation and De-Escalation in Irregular War: a Clausewitzian Case Study 
72 
 
Total N 2 
BBC 1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 2 
Total N 5 
26-Sep-2012 Source AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 1 
27-Sep-2012 Source The 
Telegraph 
1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 1 
29-Sep-2012 Source Reuters 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
Total N 3 
Total N 32 
 
 
Table 17: Article Subject Frequency per Source: October 1-15 
 Subject 
Date 02-Oct-
2012 
Source AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 1 
04-Oct- Source BBC 1 Regional 
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2012 (in)stability 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 2 
Total N 2 
05-Oct-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
Total N 1 
06-Oct-
2012 
Source AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 2 
Total N 2 
07-Oct-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 2 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 2 
The 
Telegraph 
1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 2 
Total N 6 
08-Oct-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 2 
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AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 2 
Total N 5 
09-Oct-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 1 
The 
Telegraph 
1 Strong actor de-
escalation 
Total N 1 
Total N 3 
10-Oct-
2012 
Source AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 2 
Total N 2 
11-Oct-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
The 
Telegraph 
1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 3 
12-Oct-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
Total N 2 
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13-Oct-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
Total N 1 
14-Oct-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
3 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 3 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor 
escalation 
3 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 3 
The 
Telegraph 
1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 7 
15-Oct-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 1 
Total N 1 
Total N 36 
 
 
Table 18: Article Subject Frequency per Source: October 16-31 
 Subject 
Date 16-Oct-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
Total N 2 
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17-Oct-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Strong actor de-
escalation 
Total N 2 
BBC 1 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
Total N 3 
18-Oct-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 2 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 2 
Total N 4 
19-Oct-
2012 
Source AFP 1 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
Total N 1 
21-Oct-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 1 
Total N 2 
22-Oct-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 2 
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Total N 3 
23-Oct-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 2 
AFP 1 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
Total N 3 
24-Oct-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 2 
AFP 1 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
The 
Telegraph 
1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor 
escalation 
3 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 3 
Total N 6 
25-Oct-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 1 
Total N 2 
26-Oct-
2012 
Source AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 1 
27-Oct-
2012 
Source The 
Telegraph 
1 Regional 
(in)stability 
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Total N 1 
Total N 1 
29-Oct-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Weak actor 
escalation 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
3 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 3 
BBC 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
Total N 4 
30-Oct-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
weak actor 
Total N 2 
Total N 3 
31-Oct-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 1 
Total N 3 
Total N 38 
 
 
Table 19: Article Subject Frequency per Source: November 1-13 
 Subject 
Date 02-Nov- Source Reuters 1 Domestic Rivalry: 
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2012 strong actor 
Total N 1 
Total N 1 
03-Nov-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 1 
04-Nov-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Strong actor de-
escalation 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
Total N 2 
05-Nov-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 2 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
3 Regional 
(in)stability 
4 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 4 
The 
Telegraph 
1 Domestic Rivalry: 
strong actor 
Total N 1 
Total N 7 
06-Nov-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 2 
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08-Nov-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
Total N 3 
09-Nov-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 3 
10-Nov-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 2 
11-Nov-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 2 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 2 
The 
Telegraph 
1 Strong actor 
escalation 
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2 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 2 
Total N 6 
12-Nov-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor 
escalation 
3 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 3 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 Weak actor de-
escalation 
Total N 2 
The 
Telegraph 
1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Regional 
(in)stability 
3 Regional 
(in)stability 
4 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 4 
Total N 10 
13-Nov-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
Reuters 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 2 
Total N 39 
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Table 20: Article Subject Frequency per Source: November 14-21 
 Subject 
 14-Nov-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor 
escalation 
3 Strong actor 
escalation 
4 Regional 
(in)stability 
5 International 
reaction: 
condemnation of 
strong/support of 
weak actor 
Total N 5 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
The 
Telegraph 
1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 8 
15-Nov-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Weak actor 
escalation 
2 Weak actor 
escalation 
3 International 
reaction: 
condemnation of 
strong/support of 
weak actor 
4 International 
reaction: 
condemnation of 
strong/support of 
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weak actor 
Total N 4 
BBC 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
2 International 
reaction: 
condemnation of 
strong/support of 
weak actor 
Total N 2 
AFP 1 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 1 
Total N 7 
16-Nov-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 International 
reaction: call for 
end of violence 
Total N 2 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor 
escalation 
3 Weak actor 
escalation 
4 Regional 
(in)stability 
5 International 
reaction: 
condemnation of 
strong/support of 
weak actor 
Total N 5 
The 
Telegraph 
1 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
BBC 1 International 
reaction: 
condemnation of 
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strong/support of 
weak actor 
Total N 1 
Total N 9 
17-Nov-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Weak actor 
escalation 
Total N 2 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor 
escalation 
3 Strong actor 
escalation 
4 Weak actor 
escalation 
5 International 
reaction: 
condemnation of 
strong/support of 
weak actor 
Total N 5 
Total N 7 
18-Nov-
2012 
Source AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor 
escalation 
3 Regional 
(in)stability 
Total N 3 
Reuters 1 Weak actor 
escalation 
2 International 
reaction: 
condemnation of 
strong/support of 
weak actor 
Total N 2 
The 1 International 
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Telegraph reaction: 
condemnation of 
weak/support of 
strong actor 
Total N 1 
Total N 6 
19-Nov-
2012 
Source AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor 
escalation 
3 International 
reaction: call for 
end of violence 
4 International 
reaction: call for 
end of violence 
5 International 
reaction: call for 
end of violence 
Total N 5 
The 
Telegraph 
1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor 
escalation 
3 Strong actor 
escalation 
4 International 
reaction: call for 
end of violence 
Total N 4 
Reuters 1 International 
reaction: 
condemnation of 
weak/support of 
strong actor 
2 International 
reaction: call for 
end of violence 
3 International 
reaction: call for 
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end of violence 
4 International 
reaction: 
condemnation of 
strong/support of 
weak actor 
Total N 4 
Total N 13 
20-Nov-
2012 
Source BBC 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
Total N 1 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor 
escalation 
3 Strong actor 
escalation 
4 Weak actor 
escalation 
5 Weak actor 
escalation 
6 Weak actor 
escalation 
7 Weak actor 
escalation 
8 Weak actor 
escalation 
9 International 
reaction: call for 
end of violence 
10 International 
reaction: 
condemnation of 
strong/support of 
weak actor 
Total N 10 
Reuters 1 International 
reaction: 
condemnation of 
weak/support of 
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strong actor 
Total N 1 
The 
Telegraph 
1 International 
reaction: call for 
end of violence 
2 Strong actor de-
escalation 
3 Weak actor de-
escalation 
Total N 3 
Total N 15 
21-Nov-
2012 
Source Reuters 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Weak actor 
escalation 
3 International 
reaction: 
condemnation of 
weak/support of 
strong actor 
Total N 3 
BBC 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor 
escalation 
3 Weak actor 
escalation 
4 Weak actor 
escalation 
5 Strong actor de-
escalation 
Total N 5 
AFP 1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor 
escalation 
3 Strong actor 
escalation 
4 Weak actor 
escalation 
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5 Regional 
(in)stability 
6 International 
reaction: 
condemnation of 
weak/support of 
strong actor 
7 International 
reaction: call for 
end of violence 
8 Strong actor de-
escalation 
9 Strong actor de-
escalation 
10 Weak actor de-
escalation 
11 International 
reaction: 
condemnation of 
weak/support of 
strong actor 
Total N 11 
The 
Telegraph 
1 Strong actor 
escalation 
2 Strong actor de-
escalation 
3 Strong actor de-
escalation 
Total N 3 
Total N 22 
Total N 87 
 
Table 21: International parties' initial and secondary responses 
Reacting Party Reaction Secondary Reaction 
  UN 
  
Call to end all 
violence 
None 
UNSC 
  
Call to end all 
violence 
None 
Arab League 
  
Support of weak 
actor/condemnation 
None 
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of strong actor 
US 
  
Support of strong 
actor/condemnation 
of weak actor 
Urge weak actor to de-
escalate/show restraint 
UK 
  
Support of strong 
actor/condemnation 
of weak actor 
Urge strong actor to de-
escalate/show restraint 
Russia 
  
Call to end all 
violence 
Urge both actors to de-
escalate/show restraint 
France 
  
Call to end all 
violence 
Urge strong actor to de-
escalate/show restraint 
Egypt 
  
Support of weak 
actor/condemnation 
of strong actor 
Appeal to International 
Community to sanction 
strong actor 
Iran 
  
Support of weak 
actor/condemnation 
of strong actor 
Appeal to International 
Community to sanction 
strong actor 
NATO 
  
Support of strong 
actor/condemnation 
of weak actor 
Urge strong actor to de-
escalate/show restraint 
EU 
  
Support of strong 
actor/condemnation 
of weak actor 
Urge strong actor to de-
escalate/show restraint 
China 
 
Call to end all 
violence 
Urge both actors to de-
escalate/show restraint 
 
Table 22: Date * Subject (Domestic Rivalry: strong actor) Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Subject 
Total 
Domestic 
Rivalry: strong 
actor 
Date 15-Aug-2012 1 1 
16-Aug-2012 1 1 
17-Aug-2012 1 1 
20-Aug-2012 1 1 
21-Aug-2012 1 1 
24-Aug-2012 1 1 
31-Aug-2012 1 1 
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04-Sep-2012 1 1 
06-Sep-2012 3 3 
08-Sep-2012 1 1 
13-Sep-2012 1 1 
25-Sep-2012 1 1 
04-Oct-2012 1 1 
07-Oct-2012 1 1 
09-Oct-2012 1 1 
10-Oct-2012 1 1 
11-Oct-2012 1 1 
15-Oct-2012 1 1 
16-Oct-2012 1 1 
21-Oct-2012 1 1 
25-Oct-2012 1 1 
29-Oct-2012 1 1 
31-Oct-2012 2 2 
02-Nov-2012 1 1 
05-Nov-2012 2 2 
Total 29 29 
 
 
Uria Levy (s1300229) 
Escalation and De-Escalation in Irregular War: a Clausewitzian Case Study 
91 
 
Appendix 3: Bibliography 
Clausewitz, C. v. (1984). On War (P. H. Paret, Michael, Trans.). Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
CNN. (2012, November 21). Calm elusive as rockets rain in Gaza, Israel. Retrieved May 1, 
2013, from CNN: http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/20/world/meast/gaza-israel-
strike/index.html?hpt=hp_t1 
CNN. (2012, November 17). Israel readies to invade Gaza as strikes from both sides 
continue. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from CNN: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/16/world/meast/gaza-israel-strike 
Daub, Jonas. (2010, November 4). The Tent of Political Realism. Retrieved May 1, 2013, 
from E-IR: http://www.e-ir.info/2010/11/04/the-tent-of-political-realism/ 
Denscombe, M. (2008). The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research Projects. 
New York: McGraw Hill. 
Drohan, T. A. (2011). Bringing 'Nature of War' into Irregular Warfare Strategy: 
Contemporary Applications of Clausewitz's Trinity. Defence Studies, 11(3), 497-516. 
FOX News. (2012, November 21). Clinton presses ahead with Israel-Hamas cease-fire talks 
as violence drags on. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from FOX News: 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/11/21/clinton-headed-to-jerusalem-ramallah-and-
cairo-to-seek-end-to-israelgaza/  
Duyvesteyn, I. (2012). The Escalation and De-escalation of Irregular War: Setting Out the 
Problem, Journal of Strategic Studies, 35(5), 601-611 
Uria Levy (s1300229) 
Escalation and De-Escalation in Irregular War: a Clausewitzian Case Study 
92 
 
Duyvesteyn, I. (2012). Escalation and De-escalation of Irregular War: Some Observations and 
Conclusions, Journal of Strategic Studies, 35(5), 735-742 
 Goswami, N. (2013). Escalation and de-escalation of violence in insurgencies: Insights from 
Northeast India. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24(1), 28-56. 
Gray, C. S. (2010). Theory of Strategy, I: Enduring Nature, Changing Character. In C. S. 
Gray (Ed.), The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (pp. 15-54). Oxford: Oxford 
Scholarship Online. 
Haaretz. (2012, November 21). TEXT: Cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas. 
Retrieved May 1, 2013, from Haaretz: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/text-
cease-fire-agreement-between-israel-and-hamas.premium-1.479653  
Hancké, Bob (2010). Intelligent Research Design. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Harris, L. (2006). Introducing the Strategic Approach: An Examination of Loyalist 
Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 
8, 539-549. 
Hudson, L. T. (2007). Nation Branding Explained.   Retrieved May 1, 2013, from 
http://www.cfr.org/information-and-communication/nation-branding-explained/p14776 
IDF. (2012, November 21). Operation Pillar of Defense: Days 3-8. Retrieved May 1, 2013, 
from IDF: http://www.idf.il/1283-17607-EN/Dover.aspx 
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013, May 22). Foreign Policy. Retrieved May 25, 2013, 
from Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/pages/palestinian_ceasefire_violations_sin
ce_end_operation_cast_lead.aspx  
Uria Levy (s1300229) 
Escalation and De-Escalation in Irregular War: a Clausewitzian Case Study 
93 
 
 
 
 
ITIC. (2012, December 6). Findings of the analysis of the dead terrorists’ names during 
“Operation Pillar of Defense” and an examination of their relation with civilians 
accidentally killed (Hebrew). Retrieved May 1, 2013, from Intelligence and Terrorism 
Information Center:  http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_20444/H_253_12_928839649.pdf 
Laqueur, W. (1978). Terrorism - A Balance Sheet. In W. Laqueur (Ed.), The Terrorism 
Reader. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Ma'an News Agency. (2012, November 21). AP, Jazeera offices damaged in Gaza airstrikes. 
Retrieved May 1, 2013, from Ma'an News Agency: 
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=540405  
Merriam-Webster. (2013). Definition of Occam's Razor.   Retrieved March 16, 2013, from 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/occam's%20razor 
Merriam-Webster. (2013). Definition of Political.   Retrieved March 18, 2013, from 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/political 
Post, J. M. (1987). Group and Organisational Dynamics of Political Terrorism: Implications 
for Counterterrorist Policy. In P. S. Wilkinson, A. M. (Ed.), Contemporary Research on 
Terrorism (pp. 307-317). Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press. 
Uria Levy (s1300229) 
Escalation and De-Escalation in Irregular War: a Clausewitzian Case Study 
94 
 
Reuters. (2012). 9-Egyptian-brokered Hamas-Israel ceasefire takes hold.   Retrieved March 
10, 2013, from http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/21/palestinians-israel-
idUSL5E8MLKCV20121121 
Reuters. (2012, November 17). Turkish PM praises Egypt for recalling envoy from Israel. 
Retrieved May 1, 2013, from Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/17/us-
palestinians-israel-turkey-egypt-idUSBRE8AG0EG20121117  
Sky News. (2012, November 19). Gaza: The Moment Media Buildings Were Hit. Retrieved 
May 1, 2013, from Sky News: http://news.sky.com/story/1013182/gaza-the-moment-media-
buildings-were-hit  
Smith, M. (2011). Strategic Theory: What it is…and just as importantly, what it isn’t. .   
Retrieved March 15, 2013, from http://www.e-ir.info/2011/04/28/strategic-theory-what-it-
is%E2%80%A6and-just-as-importantly-what-it-isn%E2%80%99t/#_edn3 
 
Smith, M. (2012). Escalation in Irregular War: Using Strategic Theory to Examine from First 
Principles. Journal of Strategic Studies, 35(5), 613-637. 
Stone, J. (2012). Escalation and the War on Terror. Journal of Strategic Studies, 35(5), 639-
661. 
United Nations Human Rights Council. (2013, March 6). Report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the implementation of Human Rights Council resolutions 
S-9/1 and S-12/1. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from United Nations Office of  the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights: 
Uria Levy (s1300229) 
Escalation and De-Escalation in Irregular War: a Clausewitzian Case Study 
95 
 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A.HRC.2
2.35.Add.1_AV.pdf 
US Department of State. (2012, November 14). Gaza Rocket Attacks. Retrieved May 1, 2013, 
from United States Department of State: 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200551.htm 
US Department of State. (2012, November 21). Remarks With Foreign Minister Mohamed 
Kamel Amr. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from United States Department of State: 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/11/200960.htm 
The Associated Press. (2012, November 19). Reporters Without Borders condemns Israeli 
strikes on building housing media outlets. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from Haaretz: 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/reporters-without-borders-condemns-
israeli-strikes-on-building-housing-media-outlets-1.478896  
The Guardian. (2012, November 15). Egyptian president condemns Israel's 'aggression' in 
Gaza. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from The Guardian: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/15/egyptian-president-condemns-israel-gaza  
The Guardian. (2012, November 18). Israel ready to expand Gaza offensive, says Binyamin 
Netanyahu. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from The Guardian: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/18/israel-ready-expand-gaza-offensive  
The Huffington Post. (2012, November 21). Israel Hits Agence France-Presse Building In 
Gaza Airstrike. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from The Huffington Post: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/20/israel-agence-france-presse-
gaza_n_2168376.html 
Uria Levy (s1300229) 
Escalation and De-Escalation in Irregular War: a Clausewitzian Case Study 
96 
 
The Huffington Post. (2012, November 21). Egypt President Mohammed Morsi: Gaza Truce 
Deal Will Be Reached On Tuesday. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from Huffington Post: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/20/mohammed-morsi-gaza-truce_n_2164404.html  
The Huffington Post. (2012, November 20). Israel Airstrikes Kill Three Palestinian 
Journalists. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from Huffington Post: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/20/israel-strikes-kill-palestinian-
journalists_n_2166428.html  
The Independent. (2012, November 18). Israel pounds Gaza from air as troops assemble. 
Retrieved May 1, 2013, from The Independent: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-pounds-gaza-from-air-as-
troops-assemble-8326924.html  
The Jerusalem Post. (2012, November 16). Barak: Strikes just the beginning of IDF 
Operation. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from The Jerusalem Post: 
http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Barak-Strikes-just-the-beginning-of-IDF-
operations 
The Jerusalem Post. (2012, November 16). Ashton, Merkel say Israel has right to defend 
itself. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from The Jerusalem Post: http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-
and-Politics/Ashton-Merkel-say-Israel-has-right-to-defend-itself  
The Jerusalem Post. (2012, November 16). Cabinet OKs 75,000 reservists for possible Gaza 
operation. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from The Jerusalem Post: 
http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Article.aspx?id=292195  
Uria Levy (s1300229) 
Escalation and De-Escalation in Irregular War: a Clausewitzian Case Study 
97 
 
The New York Times. (2012, November 17). Israel Broadens Its Bombing in Gaza to Include 
Government Sites. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from The New York Times: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-conflict.html?_r=0  
The Telegraph. (2012, November 18). Gaza: William Hague warns that ground invasion 
would damage Israel. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from The Telegraph: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/9686058/Gaza-William-
Hague-warns-that-ground-invasion-would-damage-Israel.html  
The Telegraph. (2012, November 16). Israel and Gaza conflict: rocket from Gaza lands near 
Jerusalem. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from The Telegraph: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/9681562/Israel-and-Gaza-
conflict-rocket-from-Gaza-lands-near-Jerusalem.html  
The Times of Israel. (2012, November 15). IDF pummels Gaza, orders call-up after rockets 
encroach on Tel Aviv area. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from Times of Israel: 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/southern-israel-under-fire-air-force-strikes-terrorist-targets-in-
gaza/  
The Washington Post. (2012, November 21). With Hillary Clinton’s dash to Middle East, 
Obama signals a shift in his approach. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from The Washington Post: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sending-in-hillary-clinton-obama-
signals-a-shift-in-his-approach-to-middle-east/2012/11/20/b74f5258-3332-11e2-9cfa-
e41bac906cc9_story.html  
Yarger, H. R. (2006). Strategy, Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big. 
Ynet News. (2013, January 20). Chuck Norris endorses Netanyahu. Retrieved May 15, 2013 
from Ynet News: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4334428,00.html 
